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Abstract 
Over 1975-2003 nearly 200 new constitutions were drawn up in countries at risk of conflict, as 
part of peace processes and the adoption of multiparty political systems. The process of writing 
constitutions is considered to be very important to the chances of sustaining peace, and The 
Commonwealth and the US Institute for Peace have developed good practice guidelines in this 
area. These emphasize consultation, openness to diverse points of view and representative 
ratification procedures. But assessing the impact of constitution-writing processes on violence is 
methodologically difficult, since there are many channels of influence in the relationship. This 
paper reports on preliminary findings from an ongoing research project into the effects of 
processes in constitution-writing. Regression analysis is used to control for important contextual 
features such as differences in income levels and ethnic diversity across countries. A key 
finding is that differences in the degree of participation in the drafting of constitutions has no 
major effect on post-ratification levels of violence in some parts of the world, such as Europe, 
but does make a difference in Africa, the Americas, and the Pacific together. 
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Between 1975 and 2003, nearly 200 new constitutions appeared in countries at risk of 
internal violence. Internationally brokered peace accords entailed the development of 
constitutions not only in the Balkans but also in Cambodia, East Timor, Rwanda, 
Chad, Mozambique, and the Comoros. New fundamental laws featured in the 
adoption of multiparty systems from Albania to Zambia.  
The Commonwealth, the US Institute of Peace, and other organizations have started to 
develop good practice guidelines for the conduct of constitution writing. Implicit in 
these initiatives is a belief that the process used to develop a new constitution 
exercises both an indirect effect on violence, by shaping who has a voice in choosing 
the substantive terms, and a direct effect, by influencing senses of inclusiveness or 
levels of compromise, for example. Procedural choices help decide who has a chance 
to speak, the range of community interests taken into account, feelings of trust and 
inclusion, the balance between quiet persuasion and grandstanding, and the 
willingness to compromise. In the initial years of the life of a new constitution, when 
politicians are still exploring what the terms mean, process may influence levels of 
conflict more strongly than content. While it takes time for people to learn about the 
incentive structures new constitutions create, the drafting process itself sends signals 
that have an immediate impact on attitudes. 
It is not hard to think of examples of constitution-writing processes that have 
aggravated levels of conflict. For example, Africa specialists often contrast the 
divergent experiences of countries that held national conferences as part of the move 
to multiparty rule. In Congo-Brazzaville, the organization and tone of the conference 
intensified ethnic conflict and distrust among political elites, precipitating civil war. 
In Chad, the 1996 conference helped worsen a Francophone/Arab rift. In Togo, the 
military held delegates hostage. By contrast, the design and management of the 
national conferences in Benin and Mali instilled higher levels cooperation among 
political elites and established models for resolving problems well after the transition 
had ended. Venezuela and Colombia join the list of countries where drafting did little 
to ease tensions, although government respect for human rights improved, post-
ratification, in Colombia. Spain, South Africa, and Namibia attract attention as 
happier stories, although they left important issues unresolved and although violence 
diminished only very slowly in the Spanish case. 
It is plausible to think that certain kinds of features affect subsequent levels of 
violence, however. Along with some of the participants in the US Institute of Peace 
working group, the Commonwealth has posited that the character of public 
participation—representativeness and consultation—influences the degree to which 
constitution drafting dampens violence. When the Commonwealth developed best 
practice guidelines for constitution making in 1999, it stressed the need for public 
consultation, openness to diverse points of view, and representative ratification 
procedures.1 In particular it emphasized the need to engage the ordinary citizen in the 
drafting process. For example, the proposals include the following (emphasis by the 
author):  
                                                 
1  See the Durban statement of 1999, www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/const/practices.htm  
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—  ‘…Governments must adopt credible constitution making; that is, a process 
that constructively engages the majority of the population’. 
—  ‘[Governments ‘are encouraged to ensure that …’] … the public is informed 
and involved at all stages …’ 
—  ‘The process is made receptive and open to the diverse views existing in 
society’. 
—  ‘[Governments ‘are encouraged to ensure that …’] … ordinary people are 
empowered to make effective contributions …’ 
—  ‘Governments should assist and empower civil society groups to effectively 
participate in the constitution-making process and in the promotion of 
constitutionalism’. 
—  ‘The public should be regularly informed at every reasonable stage about the 
progress of the constitutional process’. 
—  ‘Mechanisms used for adopting or ratifying constitutions should be credible 
and truly representative of the peoples’ views’. 
A number of very serious challenges bedevil the ability to give a social science 
answer to the question the Commonwealth and the US Institute of Peace have asked. 
One of the obvious problems for anyone who strives to offer an empirical answer is 
that constitution writing embraces a bundle of procedures, not a single identifiable 
decision rule. It generally covers a number of functions, organized in stages: 
negotiation of ground rules; development of interim documents or immutable 
principles; preparation of an initial text; deliberation and adoption of a final draft; 
ratification and promulgation. There are several formal ways to assemble these tasks. 
In one common model, a commission prepares a text on the request of the executive, 
which then submits the recommendations in whole or in part to a regular legislature or 
constituent assembly for deliberation, adoption, and ratification. Another approach 
begins with a national conference or convention to develop guidelines and elects a 
transitional legislature from its members. The transitional legislature then appoints a 
commission to prepare the text. It debates, modifies, and adopts the draft, and it sends 
the final version to a referendum. Still other processes are executive-driven or include 
combatants in an agenda-setting role. In practice, countries have experimented with a 
wide range of approaches and within these they have varied dramatically with respect 
to the representativeness of key assemblies, decision rules, publicity, public 
consultation, and other matters. The number of permutations and combinations makes 
identification of like cases for comparison quite difficult.  
The second major challenge arises from the fact that an important outcome of interest 
to policymakers, internal conflict, especially violent conflict, is not proximate to 
procedural choice. That is, many things affect internal conflict, and it may prove 
difficult to pinpoint how much of the variation in violence, before and after, results 
from constitution writing, compared to post-ratification events, underlying sources of 
tension, the legacy of tension from prior periods of violence, etc. Although it is 
possible to control for the most obvious of these influences, as the period under  
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consideration lengthens there is a greater chance that idiosyncratic events specific to a 
given country or features of the substantive terms of a particular constitution will 
complicate the analysis and make broad generalizations difficult. Further, past a 
certain point, the greater the number of such influences we try to take into account, 
the harder it is to draw clear causal inferences.  
Finally, the relationship between process and violence flows through multiple lines of 
influence. Some of these are direct. For example, process may shape public 
perceptions of fairness, make key players feel included, set a model for subsequent 
interaction among political elites, or enhance the members of the interested public to 
monitor official adherence to substantive constitutional terms. Others are indirect; 
drafting procedures affect who has a say in choosing substantive terms, which in turn 
shapes willingness to comply with agreements. Measures of post-ratification violence 
at best capture only the net effects of these various causal stories. Discerning which 
lines of influence are most important is something we can do only with respect to 
small numbers of cases, if at all. 
The claims that underlie the Commonwealth’s best practice guidelines are really 
about the effects of complex procedures taken as a whole, and to put these kinds of 
claims to an empirical test requires some way to identify and evaluate constitution-
writing processes writ large with respect to the general qualities the Commonwealth 
privileges. Thus, this chapter tries to summarize important aspects of participatoriness 
in a variety of ways. First it classifies constitution-writing episodes by the character of 
the main deliberative body. Using regression analysis it asks whether elected 
assemblies and broadly representative national conferences are associated with lower 
levels of violence in the post-ratification period, controlling for important elements of 
context and the use of various consultative strategies. Second, it uses a statistical tool 
called latent class analysis to identify styles of constitution making differentiated from 
one another with respect to eight key procedural features. This paper reports very 
tentative initial results from this research and suggests that in some contexts the 
Commonwealth’s recommendations may have empirical support. Finally, the chapter 
presents some evidence about the use of public consultation. 
2  The question and underlying theory 
The claim that more open drafting processes are more conducive to peace has several 
real-world referents. These include cases like the process in Uganda in 1995, and in 
Kenya between 1997 and 2005, where a broadly representative commission held 
public hearings in the country’s districts before completing the initial text and 
delivered its recommendations to a large national conference, whose delegates were 
partly elected and partly nominated by civic associations and other groups. 
Throughout the process, civic groups and newspapers entertained extensive discussion 
of proposals. Brazil, Nicaragua, Eritrea, Trinidad, and a number of other countries 
have at various times sponsored similarly participatory constitution-writing exercises.  
The concept of participatory constitution drafting embraces some conventional ideas 
about the importance of broad representation in deliberative bodies as well as some  
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more unconventional claims about the need for popular involvement. In the abstract, 
there are several broad ways in which participatory procedures might shape violence. 
—  Process influences the range of interests considered, not only through 
delegate selection rules, but also through the incentives it offers for players 
to adopt long versus short time-horizons.  
—  Process influences the balance between quiet persuasion, compromise, and 
grandstanding. For example, rules that lock delegates into positions or 
encourage public campaigning for subsequent political office are generally 
counterproductive. 
—  Process influences enforcement of terms after ratification. If citizens are 
engaged in the process through public consultation and civic education, they 
are more likely to know the rough parameters of accepted behaviour under 
the new constitution, monitor the behaviour of officials, and impede those 
who transgress. Where leaders are aware that citizens are better able to 
monitor boundary lines, they may be more likely to refrain from actions that 
transgress, anticipating that they will meet resistance.2 
—  Process influences sense of inclusion and trust (social capital). The tone of 
proceedings shapes whether political elites and ordinary citizens feel 
included or excluded, forward-thinking or vengeful.  
—  Procedures that are congruent with underlying cultural norms of fairness 
may signal information about the future behaviour of decisionmakers, instil 
higher levels of trust, and reduce the likelihood that differences of opinion 
will resolve themselves violently. 
—  Process can create a model for subsequent behaviour of political elites in 
resolving problems in non-violent ways. 
 
The enthusiasm for participatory processes may be well founded, but there are also 
reasons to exercise caution in assuming that participation brings happy outcomes. 
Despite their many attractions, participatory processes can prove very difficult to 
organize and manage. For instance, delays in translation, combined with slowness in 
moving deliberations forward, can sow distrust and discord as they did at Chad’s 
national conference in 1996. Or, to take another example, the method of canvassing 
local opinion may lead to concerns about fairness, as happened during the 
development of Nicaragua’s 1987 constitution. Instead of a linear relationship 
between popular participation and conflict reduction, we might instead anticipate that 
                                                 
2  The ‘monitoring theory’ often raises eyebrows, but it is not as implausible as it may first appear. 
After new constitutions ushered in a new multiparty rule, several African leaders sought passage of 
amendments to eliminate term-limits or grant themselves immunity. These bids to hold onto power 
have often encountered popular resistance where drafting was highly consultative but appear to 
have won out where the prior drafting process was executive-centered or highly elite-driven. For 
example, Mali’s Konare backed away from an amendment designed to grant him immunity from 
prosecution, and Malawi’s Muluzi conceded that he would not win permission for a third term as 
president.   
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the effects are conditioned by the way these functions are carried out. Where there are 
no concerns about fairness and/or there is little polarization, these processes may 
reduce violence but where management problems—delays, translation disputes, 
grandstanding—cause significant groups to make charges of bias, public consultation 
and broadly representative assemblies may each aggravate the level of conflict.  
Moreover, officially organized channels for participation by ordinary citizens may 
prove less important in some settings than in others. Where there is a history of free 
and fair elections, and a reasonably high regard for politicians as representatives, it is 
possible that measures to solicit popular opinion or to engage a more diverse group of 
delegates to the main deliberative body in constitution writing may prove 
inconsequential for overall levels of conflict. Devices to ensure high levels of popular 
consultation may be more influential in areas without much history of electoral 
politics, and where the legitimacy of delegates may be in question. 
3 The  data 
The information used in the analysis comes from a new database constructed with the 
support of the US Institute of Peace and from a modified version of a database on 
internal conflict prepared by the PRS group. The ‘drafting database’ records roughly 
130 procedural and contextual features of over 194 constitution-writing cases carried 
out since 1975. The cases include new constitutions and regime-changing 
amendments where there was at least a minimal chance that those who disagreed with 
the incumbents could take up arms. Regime-changing amendments include provisions 
that affect participation and contestation (e.g., shifts from authoritarian rule to 
multiparty systems or vice versa), civil and political liberties, property rights, regional 
or ethnic autonomy, and significant efforts to re-allocate power among the branches 
of government. In most cases, these modifications reflect what ancient philosophers 
might have termed a change in the sense of political good. That is, they imply new 
standards of political virtue.  
For inclusion in the dataset, there must also be a minimal chance that a dissatisfied 
party could take up arms. Here, the dataset errs in favour of a generous definition. 
Ability to take up arms is hard to assess. In most developing countries, limited 
territorial control by the state has meant that even under highly authoritarian 
governments it is possible for a faction of the elite or the populace to use violence. 
Therefore, on this criterion the dataset excludes only constitutions drafted in the 
USSR pre-Gorbachev, the PRC, and North Korea.  
The dataset imposes an income threshold, but that threshold is quite high and is 
designed only to exclude cases in an upper income category where there are few cases 
in the past 35 years and thus no real opportunities for systematic comparison. The 
countries excluded by the income threshold are Canada, the Netherlands, and 
Belgium. A provisional regional distribution of the cases for 1975-2002 appears in 
Table 1. 
The information in the database comes from documentary sources and from 
interviews with drafters. The sources used include Constitutions of the Countries of 
the World, the Inter-Parliamentary Union Chronicle, Keesings Archive, the Lexis- 
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Nexis World News backfile, and a wide variety of regionally specific yearbooks, 
personal accounts, and academic articles.  
In this research, violence is the main indicator of ‘success’, although that is certainly 
not the only important metric. The study uses a range of measures, including pre/post-
ratification differences in average level of violence over five-year periods, pre/post-
ratification differences in average level of violence that subsume the ratification year 
into the ‘pre-ratification’ period, comparison of the level of violence in the worst 
years pre/post, the trend in violence in the five years after ratification, the rate of 
suspension or replacement of the new constitution, and ‘strict’ versions of these 
measures that take into account ‘degree of democracy’.3 The study focuses on the 
short-term, the five years after ratification, for two practical reasons. First, if ‘process’ 
has an effect at all, we are most likely to observe its impact in the immediate 
aftermath of ratification, before the incentives built into the substantive terms 
themselves overwhelm any memory of what transpired. The second reason is that not 
much time has yet elapsed since the most recent wave of constitution drafting.  
The information about violence takes the form of monthly, country-centred internal 
conflict data. The data come from a political risk resource developed by the PRS 
Group (ICRG Table 3-B), expanded to include a wider range of countries and earlier 
years. The database assigns each country a score on a scale of 0-12, with 0 signifying 
intense civil conflict resulting in high levels of deaths on a broad geographic scale and 
12 indicating complete calm. The ICRG data on military involvement (coups, coup 
attempts, mutinies, etc.) are less reliable than the internal conflict dataset in the 
author’s view. Therefore, the study re-computed the military data for many cases. 
Unless otherwise stated, the conflict data used in this project are the sum of the scores 
on the internal conflict and military variables, with low scores indicating high-
intensity conflict and high military involvement. The scores range from 0 to 18.4 
Table 1 
constitutions adopted, by decade and region 
(cases in current database) 
  Region  






Islands  Total 
1970s 11 5 6 5 6 1  34 
1980s 19 7 2 4 6      38 
1990s  50 11 13 11 14  9  108 
2000s  4 2 1 3 3 1  14 
Total  84 25 22 23 29 11  194 
 
                                                 
3  The measures of post-ratification trend in violence and the strict measure of ‘success’ that records 
improvement only if it takes place in a ‘free’ political environment do not appear in the preliminary 
results reported in this paper. 
4  It is important to exercise caution in using this information. In the author’s view, comparisons of 
absolute levels of violence across countries are not highly reliable, although yearly averages are 
more reliable than monthly figures. As a result, this research project compares trends and 
differences, not absolute levels.  
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3  Conceptualizing and measuring ‘participatoriness’ 
The first analytic challenge is to distinguish constitution-writing processes by their 
‘level of participatoriness’. The authors of the Commonwealth guidelines do not tell 
us much about the norms or considerations that shaped them, but the aim of 
participation is at least partly to ensure the representation of popular points of view in 
the decisions made and political philosophers have made useful contributions on this 
point. For example, in her book, The Concept of Representation, Pitkin (1967) 
sketched several alternative definitions of representation that are potentially useful in 
understanding variations in public engagement in the preparation of new 
constitutions. These alternatives help shape this project’s attempt to translate the 
Commonwealth’s suggestions into operational measures. 
One definition of representation focuses exclusively on whether there was an act by 
which members of the public authorized delegates to make decisions on their behalf, 
without specifying any standards for subsequent delegate behaviour. This view is 
rooted in the work of Thomas Hobbes. It is an important sub-current in thinking about 
the design of constitution-making processes and draws attention to the methods used 
to select decisionmakers at each stage of the drafting process. It draws attention to the 
use of elections, selection by interest group representatives, executive appointment, 
etc. in the choice of those who design the ground rules, frame immutable principles, 
develop the draft, and exercise the power to ratify.  
Pitkin elaborates a second approach to the definition of representation and 
participation that shares the formalistic character of the first but also considers 
whether there is a mechanism for making decisionmakers accountable. In addition to 
asking what role ordinary people play in selecting delegates, this approach requires 
that we consider whether the grant of authority implicit in the act of selecting 
delegates was unlimited or whether the public retained power to comment prior to 
adoption and to decline to accept the results. It focuses attention on the ability of the 
public to check the behaviour of delegates—for example, through referenda (Pitkin 
1967). 
A less formalistic understanding emphasizes the importance of the information 
provided to the deliberative process by people who mirror the population as a whole. 
Inclusiveness matters in this view because it provides data about a larger range of 
concerns. In this approach it is important to consider whether the bodies with 
decisionmaking power are highly representative and whether there are mechanisms 
for consulting with a broad range of social groups in the development of the initial 
text and in the final draft. It also encompasses concern for consultation of the 
‘interested public’ (civil society organizations, political parties) and ordinary citizens. 
This approach taps a special concern behind the Commonwealth principles.  
A fourth approach to categorizing processes focuses on procedures that help place 
decisionmakers behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ (Vermeule 2001: 399). That is, it focuses 
on use of procedures that increase any given delegate’s uncertainty about his future 
position or the future position of his constituents. Veil rules introduce prospectivity, 
generality, and durability into decisionmaking. That is, they structure deliberation in a 
way that increases the likelihood that a broader range of interests will be considered. 
One might include in this category rules that reduce the dominance of current interests  
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by setting limits on eligibility, by forcing recusal of some kinds of incumbents (e.g., 
the military), or by restricting conflicts of interest in other ways, especially through 
mediation. Underlying this approach is the idea that resources for active participation 
are not uniformly distributed and influence in deliberative bodies may also privilege 
some kinds of people over others. This approach captures the Commonwealth’s 
interest in ensuring that the strongest or most vocal interests do not outweigh broader 
community concerns. 
3.1  Character of the main deliberative body as shorthand for participatoriness 
In practice, most of us, especially lawyers, are quick to point out that we rarely rest 
our judgements about the participatory character of a constitution drafting process on 
only one element of the bundle of procedures that any drafting process entails. 
However, as a shorthand we often distinguish between processes according the 
character of the main deliberative body. Thus, in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali 
Husaine al-Sistani insisted on an elected constituent assembly or legislature, a body 
putatively more democratic or representative than an indirectly elected legislature, an 
appointed national conference, a roundtable of key parties, or an executive-directed 
process. The following chart shows the distribution of constitution-making episodes 
defined by the character of this feature.  
In the analysis it is possible to arrange types of deliberative bodies on a scale of 
representativeness, such that executive-directed constitution making and roundtables 
or peace negotiations among warring parties anchor the low end and elective bodies, 
elected constituent assemblies and legislatures, anchor the high end. Bodies that 
afford representation through indirect election or appointment by corporate groups, 
such as unions, appear in the middle. Of the 125 cases for which we have the most 
adequate data on violence (post-1983 cases), there is a rough correlation between the 
representativeness of the main deliberative body and a reduction in violence over the 
five years post-ratification. That is, where the main body was elected, levels of   
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violence remained the same in 35 per cent of country cases and improved in 42.6 per 
cent of cases. By comparison, among the executive-appointed bodies, a reduction in 
violence took place in only 24 per cent of cases and in 40 per cent of instances 
violence worsened. 
Of course, when pressed most would want to consider the methods used to choose a 
drafting committee, the voting rules of the several bodies involved in the development 
of the initial language and the subsequent debate, etc., in addition to veil rules and 
other features. For the purposes of the kind of comparison necessary to distil ‘lessons’ 
or guidelines, this more complex notion of participatoriness poses serious challenges. 
3.2  Defining participatoriness across multiple dimensions: in search of style 
To capture multiple procedural dimensions at once, it is possible to borrow some 
statistical tools from medicine, market research, and the social sciences. The approach 
used here sorts country cases into distinctive classes of like processes and helps 
identify styles of constitution making, where ‘style’ is a function of features that shape 
authorization and accountability. Latent class analysis is a statistical method for 
finding subtypes in multivariate categorical data using maximum likelihood 
estimation. Market researchers use it to identify like-minded consumers or ‘market 
segments’. Medical researchers use the technique to identify diagnostic categories. 
Here it is helpful for identifying constitution-writing cases with similar authorization 
and accountability procedures when there are many possible procedural permutations 
and combinations and more instances than the human mind can easily juggle at once. 
There are several possible dimensions on which one could define classes. Table 2 
shows the ingredients used in sorting cases into classes or styles and the main models 
considered. The determination of the ‘best’ model is based in part on the CAIC 
statistic (the lower the better). Because the technique always finds some cases hard to 
situate and allocates some cases partly to one class and partly to another, the degree of 
overlap matters too, although it is in acceptable bounds for all of the models tried 
here. The intuitiveness of the results is another factor that figures in the selection of 
the best model. Some models, that are plausible a priori, group cases in a manner 
slightly out of line with the intuitions of those who have studied them closely.  
The styles defined by the chosen model have real-world meanings: 
—  Style 1: In most of these cases there were no initial negotiations to establish a 
process. Warring parties created immutable principles or an interim 
constitution in about a quarter of these cases. In about half, the main 
deliberative body was appointed by the executive, the military, or a departing 
colonial authority. About a quarter of these bodies had over 500 members. 
About half of these cases had referenda, while half did not.  
—  Style 2: There were initial negotiations to establish a process in about half of 
these cases. In all, the main deliberative body was popularly elected by SMP 
decision rules. There were multiple committees or commissions involved in 
the preparation of the initial text. A referendum took place in almost all 
instances.  
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—  Style 3: In most of these cases there were no initial negotiations to establish a 
process. In all of these cases, the main deliberative body was popularly 
elected by SMP decision rules. In most of these cases there was no 
referendum. 
—  Style 4: The drafting process followed rules set out in the previous 
constitution in about half these cases but entailed negotiations in the other 
half. Most of the main deliberative bodies in this group were elected via a 
proportional representation system or mixed member system. In most of 
these cases there was no referendum.  
—  Style 5: There were initial negotiations to establish a process in all of these 
cases and in about half these conversations embraced a wide range of 
political groups or social and economic groups. In almost half of these cases, 
the delegates to the main deliberative body were elected from the ranks of 
the legislature or otherwise indirectly elected. This category is less 
distinctive than the others and may embrace some cases that are not 
participatory, as well as embrace many that are. Further refinements in the 
latent class models will aim to remove these ambiguities. 
—  Style 6: In most of these cases, there were no initial negotiations to establish 
a process, but in over a third an elected body or highly representative 
appointed group developed immutable principles. The main deliberative 
body was appointed by a national conference or representatives of economic 
and social groups in almost half of these cases, but in just under a quarter the 
executive or military appointed the delegates. About a quarter of these 
bodies numbered over 500 delegates. In almost all of these cases there was a 
referendum. 
—  Style 7: In most of these cases, there were no initial negotiations to establish 
a process. In almost all, the main deliberative body was appointed by the 
executive, the military, or a departing colonial authority. In no case were 
delegates elected. In most of these cases, there were fewer than 15 key 
decisionmakers. In almost all of these cases there was a referendum. 
—  Style 8: In most of these cases there were no initial negotiations to establish a 
process. The delegates to the assembly were selected by warring parties in 
most of these cases or selected through indirect election. In none of these 
cases was there a referendum. 
Although the styles are not ordinal (that is, style 8 is not higher or better than styles 
1-7 with respect to participatoriness), a careful look at the relationship between 
component variables and classes suggests that styles 2 through 4 are more 
participatory than styles 1, 7, and 8. Beyond this distinction all we can say is that the 
styles are different but not a priori better or worse with respect to participatoriness. 
Styles 2 through 4 include direct elections to select the main deliberative body. Styles 
5 and 6 are more ambiguous. Style 5 includes some processes where the main 
deliberative body was indirectly elected. Style 6 embraces most of the national 
conferences or national conventions, which typically entail no elections but are often  
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broadly representative. Because the function or role of the conference itself has varied 
enormously across the cases that we often consider part of this group, some of the 
national conferences turn up in other style categories as well.  
The styles of constitution writing are not distributed uniformly across regions, 
countries with different colonial heritages, or countries with different levels of 
economic development. Table 3 suggests that only in Africa and West/Central Asia 
have countries experimented with a full range of styles or nearly so, including those 
that are less participatory with respect to authorization and accountability. Style 4 
accounts for 56 per cent of the cases in the Americas. Style 3 predominates in 
East/South Asia and Europe. Half the drafting processes in formerly British areas 
have style 3, while 41 per cent of formerly French areas are style 7. Post-coup cases 
are also style 7. 
Table 2 
Composition of models used to generate latent classes 
 Model   
Composition  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Representativeness of body that chose  ground  rules X X X X X X 
Authorization of body that developed immutable 
principles, form of 
X X X X X X 
Whether body as whole, committee, or separate 
commission formulated initial text 
X  X      
Whether more than one body helped develop the 
initial text 
X X    X X X 
Authorization of main deliberative  body,  form  of  X X X X X X 
Type of electoral system, if any, used to select main 
deliberative body 
X X X X X X 
Size of main deliberative body  X  X  X  X  X   
Executive recusal from deliberative body      X  X     
Whether executive had right to amend text before 
submission 
X  X      
Whether vote of an elected or highly representative 
body required for ratification 
X X X X X X 
Whether national referendum required for ratification X  X  X  X  X  X 
Whether process internationally mediated  X          X 
Classes  8 8 8 8 8 8 
CAIC  5189.4 4857 4038.4 4389.6 3978 3588.7
% overlap  4.6  2.9  4.9 4.8 6.7 8.7 
Intuitively plausible classes?  no  partial  yes  yes  yes  partial 





Style of participation, by region 
(frequency; column percentage except for total) 
 Region 




West/Central Europe Pacific  Islands
1  10   5  2   
  11.9%   22.7%  8.7%   
2  4 3   3 4 3 
  4.8% 12.0%   13.0% 13.8% 27.3% 
3  16 4  10 9  15 3 
  19.0% 16.0% 45.5% 39.1% 51.7% 27.3% 
4  8  14 1 3 7   
  9.5% 56.0%  4.5% 13.0% 24.1%   
5  5   1 1 1 3 
  6.0%   4.5% 4.3% 3.4%  27.3% 
6  10 1 2   2 1 
  11.9% 4.0% 9.1%   6.9% 9.1% 
7  24 3 3 5     
  28.6% 12.0% 13.6% 21.7%     
8  7      1 
  8.3%      9.1% 
Total  84 25 22 23 29 11 
  43.3% 12.9% 11.3% 11.9% 14.9%  5.7% 
 
When grouped by multi-dimensional ‘style’, country cases display some of the 
anticipated correlations with levels of violence, though not all. The less representative 
processes (styles 1, 7, and 8) were associated with a reduction of violence in 31.4 per 
cent of cases, while the more representative styles 2 and 3 were associated with a 
reduction in violence in about 40 per cent of instances and style 4 was associated with 
a reduction in violence 64 per cent of the time. Style 5 was also associated with 
improvement, but it encompassed only 4 cases overall. Style 6 was associated with a 
reduction of violence only 9 per cent of the time. 
3.3  Participation as public consultation 
Because an important interest of the US Institute of Peace and the Commonwealth lies 
in the impact of public consultation, measures of this form of participation do not 
appear in the latent class models but are presented instead as separate scores. One 
score assesses consultation during the preparation of the initial text. A second score 
assesses consultation during deliberations about the draft, prior to adoption and 
ratification. A composite score helps identify cases in which there was consultation 
prior to the development of the draft as well as after the initial draft. A fourth score 
assesses the extent of opportunities for involvement by the interested public—civic 
groups, unions, political parties, professional associations. It reflects invitations to 
submit written contributions, meetings with civil society groups and unions, 
interviews, and a variety of other fairly standard mechanisms for consultation. A fifth  
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score assesses opportunity for participation by ordinary people, using consultation in 
remote rural areas as a proxy. 
This step makes it possible to identify cases in which various forms of consultation 
occurred, over and above the type of authorization/accountability mechanisms in 
place. Table 4 shows the frequency distribution of public consultation scores by 
region.  
Some aspects of consultation stand out. For example, in the Pacific Islands, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and Africa drafters make frequent use of public 
consultation prior to or during the preparation of the initial text, compared to Europe 
and Asia. Constitution writing that has entailed consultation both in the development 
of the initial text and in the development of the final draft is more common in Latin 
America and Africa than in other regions. Elite consultation has proven most 
extensive in Latin America and the Caribbean, where multiple devices for soliciting 
opinion from civic groups, unions, and political parties have been in effect in over 
half of all cases. In 46.7 per cent of cases in Latin America and the Caribbean, 41.3 
per cent of African cases, and the overwhelming majority of Pacific Island cases, 
drafters have sought opinion in remote rural areas as well as in the capital. Broad-
based consultation of this sort is least common in Europe. 
Simple crosstabulations suggest that there is no clear relationship between levels of 
consultation and patterns of violence post-ratification within the pool of country cases 
as a whole (that is, not broken out by region or type of conflict). One reason may be 
that in many Central and East European countries flourishing media and better 
individual access to television and radio provided many with a window on the 
proceedings, and the absence of explicitly consultative procedures in these cases may 
understate the amount of public involvement that actually existed, thus interfering 
with the ability to draw inferences about the effects of consultation more generally. 
Looking at sub-sets of the data, expected correlations do appear between extensive 
grassroots efforts to consult (‘Scope’ in the table above) and reduction in violence in 
the Americas and Asia. Elite consultation correlates with a reduction in violence in 
the Americas and in some parts of Asia as well. 
Table 4 
Consultation, by region 
(frequency; column percentage) 
Region 
Extent of 




West/Central Europe Pacific  Islands
Prior  43.2   50.0   21.1   15.6   13.0   66.7  
        
Post  17.3   25.0   22.2   47.4   26.1   33.3  
        
Prior & Post  12.2   20.0   5.6   5.3   8.7   11.1  
        
Elite   7.6   35.3   13.3   6.7   5.3   22.2  
        




4  Findings: testing theory against evidence 
What do we find, using these three approximations of representativeness and 
participatoriness? A very rough and preliminary exploration of the data is suggestive 
in its support for at least some aspects of the Commonwealth claims, though it is far 
from conclusive and the analysis requires considerable refinement. The outcome is the 
difference between the average monthly level of violence in the five years prior to the 
ratification year and the five years after ratification. A negative pre and post violence 
score indicates that conflict intensified and a positive score implies improvement.  
The causal factor of particular interest is measured in three ways. In the first test, the 
measure used is the character of the main deliberative body. Process distinguishes 
among cases very roughly according to whether constitution writing was executive-
directed (low score), brought key leaders together in a roundtable or related process, 
or centred upon an elected assembly or a representative national conference. In the 
second test, the measure used is the multi-faceted style designation that picks up eight 
different dimensions of representativeness. The style variables in the model help us 
compare the effect of the most representative approaches to the effect of the least 
representative approaches (this latter comparison group is left out of the model and 
constitutes the reference for the coefficients on the more participatory styles). The 
third test shows the additional influence of public consultation, captured by the 
variable consult. 
Regression analysis makes it possible to control for contextual features that may 
influence the outcome. The first is income level. The second is ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, a somewhat imperfect measure of the level of ethnic diversity. The 
closer the index is to 1, the higher the level of diversity. Level of respect for political 
rights in the year of ratification appears in the model as a proxy for relative respect for 
the rule of law on the part of government (Freedom House data). A high score on 
political rights indicates high respect for basic political rights. 
Finally, because the intensity of violence undoubtedly influences the performance of 
different processes and perhaps even the choice of process, the tests include a score 
for the worst level of violence in the five years prior to ratification, intensity. The 
cases used for this portion of the study include the 83 in which levels of violence were 
significant in  
The first finding is that differences in the representativeness or participatoriness of the 
drafting process have no major effect on post-ratification levels of violence in some 
parts of the world, such as Europe, but do make a difference in Africa, the Americas, 
and the Pacific Islands. The tables below present results for Africa and for Africa, the 
Americas, and the Pacific together. Although the models themselves do not capture a 
high proportion of the variance observed, the coefficients and their significance levels 
can help us gain a rough sense of whether the correlations our theories lead us to 
expect are actually present.  
A quick glance at the information in the tables provides some support for the idea that 
some forms of representativeness contribute to a reduction in violence in the five 




Dependent variable: Change in the level of violence, 
5 years pre-ratification compared to 5 years post-ratification 
Model  Unstandardized coefficients Standard error Standardized coefficients  Significance 
Constant 1.931 0.667   0.007 
Process 0.356  0.162  0.400  0.035 
Consult -0.412  0.228  -0.354  0.081 
Income level  -0.342  0.171  -0.341  0.054 
Rights 0.222  0.255  0.140  0.391 
Ethnic diversity  -0.179  0.799  -0.039  0.842 
Intensity -0.034 0.097 -0.061  0.730 
R square=0.307 
Africa, the Americas, and the Pacific  
Dependent variable: Change in the level of violence,  
5 years pre-ratification compared to 5 years post-ratification 
Model  Unstandardized coefficients Standard error Standardized coefficients  Significance 
Constant 1.631 0.598    0.009 
Process 0.267  0.153  0.270  0.088 
Consult -0.212  0.186  -0.180  0.260 
Income level  -0.049  0.126  -0.069  0.700 
Rights 0.273  0.235  0.204  0.252 
Ethnic diversity  0.382 0.648  0.089  0.559 
Intensity -0.152 0.080 -0.288  0.065 
R square=0.232 
captures the representativeness of the reform model as described above, is positive 
and statistically significant. Public consultation, consult, does not appear to play a 
strong role (because the coefficient is not statistically significant it would probably be 
a mistake to draw any inferences from the negative sign or the size of the effect). 
When we test the same model against evidence from the Americas and the Pacific as 
well as Africa, the results are weaker but they are roughly consistent, although the 
weak significance level might make one sceptical of drawing a strong inference.  
The method of selection of the main deliberative body appears to make more of a 
difference than the overall ‘participatory style’. In Africa alone and in Africa plus the 
Americas and the Pacific, more executive-directed drafting processes are negatively 
associated with reduction in violence, while more participatory styles display a 
possible beneficial effect, although the results are not statistically significant.  
Of course even with refinements, even the most conscientiously constructed 
regression model should not rest on this kind of analysis alone. Although this project 
employs a variety of techniques to identify comparable cases and explore whether 
expected correlations are present, to get at the real causal linkages it is important to 
use carefully targeted case studies. Because violence is not a proximate outcome, it is 
important to establish causal relationships through ‘process tracing’, a fancy term for 
careful history. Where there is a correlation between a procedural style or a particular  
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procedural choice, on the one hand, and ‘success’ or ‘failure’, on the other, the aim is 
to show that there is a causal connection by describing the sequence of impacts of 
procedural choice on the outcome. The case studies arising from the UNU-WIDER 
conference on Making Peace Work are especially valuable in helping us attain this 
ambition. 
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